Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents.
Introduction
In the last 10 years there has been a burst of renewed interest in auctions and auction design. From the sale of new assets and the privatization of old companies, to the design of new markets, many important practical problems have provided empiricists with new data to study and theorists with interesting, open problems to solve.
From a theoretical standpoint, auction design should be viewed as part of mechanism design with transferable utility. The di®erence is that auctions typically deal with a discrete set of assets to be assigned to agents, while mechanism design allows more general decision sets. All the results in this paper apply to auction as well as to more general mechanism design problems; hence, I will use the terms`auction' and mechanism' design interchangeably.
Consider the following basic setup. (1) There is a set of possible decisions a®ecting all the individuals (e.g., assets to be allocated); allocative externalities are allowed.
(2) Each individual receives private signals (has private information) about his own characteristics, or type. An agent's type can be multidimensional, but it only a®ects the agent in question; that is, there are no informational externalities. (3) An agent's payo® depends on the decision and his own type in a general fashion and it also depend, linearly, on his own monetary transfer. The seminal contributions of Vickrey (1963) and later Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that in such a world e±cient decisions (the ones that maximize the sum of agent's payo®s) can be implemented by using appropriate monetary transfers. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism accomplishes this by aligning every agent's payo® with social welfare. This is done, essentially, by using transfers that make each agent the residual claimant of the social surplus and then cover any de¯cit with additional charges that do not depend on his own behavior.
In many practical instances the assumption of private values, or no informational externalities, is violated. Informational externalities are present if the payo® of an agent depends not only on his own type, but also on the types (or informational signals) of the other agents. Following common usage, I will call this case the case of interdependent valuations. Among the many possible examples of interdependent valuations, consider the following three situations. First, a procedure must be set up to assign the mineral rights for a tract of land. Second, an existing company is either being acquired by one of several rivals, or it is going to be split among them.
Third, a state-owned enterprise is being privatized. In all cases, it is highly likely that di®erent parties have access to di®erent informational signals that are relevant in making an e±cient decision, some of which a®ect, possibly in di®erent ways, all parties. Note also that in all these cases it is quite likely that the informational signals are multidimensional. For example, a¯rm bidding for a tract of land may have signals about the quantity and quality of the minerals to be found and about its own cost of extraction.
Interdependent valuations have been extensively studied in the auction literature that followed from Milgrom and Weber (1982) . This literature, however, for the most part has restricted attention to symmetric bidders with a single dimensional informational signal and a single unit to be allocated among them. Furthermore, the focus has been more on the properties of speci¯c auction procedures, than on the general design problem.
Recently, Maskin (1992) , Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , and Jehiel and Moldovanu is satis¯ed. In this case there are standard mechanisms that implement the e±cient decision rule. However, they showed that no such mechanism provides agents with the incentives for e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information; agents either under-acquire, or over-acquire information.
The word standard is italicized for a good reason. In all these papers the mechanism designer is allowed to ask agents to report their types, as in a standard mechanism design problem with private values, but he is not allowed to ask agents to report their (pre-monetary transfer) payo®s from the decision after a decision has been taken. Clearly, at some point an agent will have to observe his payo® from a decision. With private values, an agent cannot extract any new information from the observation of his own payo®. On the contrary, with interdependent valuations observing his realized payo® provides the agent with new information about the types, or informational signals, of the other agents. The designer, then, should collect this information and use it. The transfers made to the agents should depend not only on the agents' reports of their types, but also on their reports of the decision payo®s.
Restricting attention to standard mechanisms, with only type reports, is not without loss of generality when valuations are interdependent. This insight is the starting point of this paper.
I allow the mechanism designer to set up two reporting stages. In the¯rst stage the designer asks about the agents' types. On the basis of these reports, the designer selects a decision. After the decision has taken e®ect, the designer asks the agents to report their realized payo®s in a second reporting stage. Then transfers are¯nalized that depend on reports in both stages. It turns out that allowing the transfers to depend on the payo® reports completely changes the conclusions of the model with interdependent valuations and multidimensional signals. First, it is always possible to implement an e±cient decision (it is also possible to balance the budget). Second, under some conditions the designer can extract the full surplus from the agents. A necessary and su±cient condition for full surplus extraction is provided in the paper. Third, it is always possible to implement the e±cient decision and to provide agents with the correct incentives for e±cient exante acquisition of information.
A¯rst pass at the intuition for my e±ciency results is the following. The designer should implement the decision that is e±cient given the signal reports of the agents in the¯rst reporting stage. Each agent should be given as a transfer the sum of the reported payo®s by all other agents in the second reporting stage. This is su±cient to make the agent a residual claimant, and hence gives him the incentive to truthfully report his signals in the¯rst reporting stage. We will see that the de¯cit so created can be covered by imposing charges on each agent that do not depend on his behavior.
Furthermore, if there is an ex-ante stage when agents can aquire information, then they will acquire the e±cient level, since each agent's incentives are aligned with the social good. In a sense that will be made precise later, the introduction of the payo® reporting stage after a decision has been made allows us to generalize the VCG mechanism to the case of interdependent valuations.
The condition that guarantees that the designer can extract the full surplus essentially says that any potentially pro¯table lie by an agent about his type in thē rst reporting stage should be detectable with positive probability from the payo® reports of the other agents. If this is so, then, when a lie is detected, the agent can be severely punished, making lying unpro¯table.
It is important to emphasize that in this paper, as well as in the previous work by Maskin (1992) , Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , and Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) (see also Ausubel (1997) and Perry and Reny (2002) ) the agents' signals are statistically independent. The focus on independent types can be easily explained. We already know from Cr ¶ emer and McLean (1985, 1988 The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and explains the inadequacy of standard mechanisms, by using three simple examples. Section 3 shows that the appropriate version of the revelation principle in a world with informational externalities requires that the designer ask agents to report their types in the¯rst reporting stage, and ask them to report realized payo®s after a decision has been made, but before transfers are¯nalized. Section 4 shows that it is always possible to implement e±cient mechanisms. Section 5 provides the necessary and su±cient condition for full surplus extraction. It also presents two versions of a model due to Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , which show that full surplus extraction requires that no signal be purely private. Section 6 shows that it is possible to have both e±cient ex-post decisions and e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Inadequacy of the Standard Revelation Mechanisms I study an auction, or, more generally, a mechanism design model with n agents. Each agent has private information about his own type µ i 2 £ i , where £ i is a closed and bounded subset of R m i . Let £ = £ n i=1 £ i be the set of type pro¯les and µ = (µ 1 ; : : : ; µ n ) be a generic element of £. Type µ i is drawn from the cumulative probability distribution F i with support £ i . In Section 3, I will derive a generalized version of the revelation principle without imposing any restriction on the distributions F i ; that is, I will allow for correlation across types of di®erent agents. In all other sections I will assume that the distributions F i are independent. Let X be the set of possible decisions, or outcomes (e.g., X could be a subset of an Euclidean space and represent the set of possible allocations of private and public goods). Agent i's payo® function U i : X £ £ £ R ! R depends on the decision x, the type pro¯le µ and his monetary transfer t i ; we have
I assume that the payo® function is linear in money and that it depends on the types of all agents. This latter assumption is what distinguishes the interdependent valuations case from that of private values, in which U i only depends on µ i . (Gresik (1991) was one of the¯rst to study a mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations; Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) use the terms \common values" and \interdependent valuations" interchangeably.)
To gain a simple intuitive understanding of this paper's contributions, it is best to start from the following examples. Example 1. The¯rst example is a simple modi¯cation of an example in Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) . There is an item for sale and two potential buyers (e.g., the item could be the right to drill oil on a tract of land and the buyers could be two wildcatters). The two buyers' valuations for the item are
where µ 1 2 [0; 2] is a private signal of buyer 1 (his type). We can think of µ 1 as the expected quantity of oil in the tract, 2 and 4 as player 1 and 2's marginal revenues, and 0 and 2 as their¯xed costs. E±ciency requires that buyer 1 get the item if µ 1 < 1 and that buyer 2 get it if µ 1 > 1. As in a standard mechanism design model, suppose that the transfers and the decision depend on the players' reports about their types.
Let t 1 : [0; 2] ! R be buyer 1's transfer function and suppose that the decision rule is e±cient; that is, the probability ± of giving the object to player 2 when µ r 1 is the reported type is The next example shows that with multi-dimensional types there are no natural conditions that guarantee the existence of e±cient standard mechanisms. has no private information. Let t 1 and t 2 be the transfers to the two players. The realized payo®s if player 2 gets the item with probability ± are
Again, in a standard mechanism the transfers and the decision depend on the reported types. Suppose that the decision rule is e±cient. Ex-post e±ciency requires that player 1 get the item if q > c and that player 2 get it if q < c; that is, the probability ± of giving the object to agent 2 when q r and c r are the reported quality and cost is
Let q 1 , q 2 , c 1 , c 2 satisfy the following inequalities
Then the transfer function t 1 : [1; 2] £ [0; 2] ! R of an e±cient standard mechanism must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
adding up the constraints we obtain a contradiction:
Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show, at di®erent levels of generality, that with multi-dimensional types this example corresponds to the generic case; that is, it is impossible to construct e±cient standard mechanisms.
I now show that an e±cient mechanism can be found in both examples if the mechanism designer can ask the players to report their realized payo®s. Denote by u r i the payo® reported by player i prior to the monetary transfer. The designer should set up two reporting stages. In the¯rst stage players report their types and a decision is implemented according to their reports. In the second stage payo®s (u r i ) are reported and transfers made that depend on both type and payo® reports. As we shall see, in both examples it is su±cient to ask only player 2 to report his realized payo®; however, in the general case the designer should ask all players to make such a report.
In example 1, the following transfer functions implement the ex-post e±cient decision rule:
where h 1 and h 2 are constants. Note that these transfers are quite similar to the transfers in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) ) except that they depend on reported payo®s. Clearly, the incentive compatibility constraint for agent 2 is satis¯ed, since t 2 does not depend on the reported payo® of player 2; truthful payo® reporting is optimal for agent 2. 
which is maximized at µ r 1 = µ 1 . Telling the truth is a Bayesian equilibrium (actually a perfect Bayesian equilibrium).
In example 2, the following transfers implement the ex-post e±cient decision rule:
where h 1 and h 2 are constants. As in the previous example, these transfers are similar to the transfers in a VCG mechanism. Since t 2 does not depend on the reported payo®, truthful reporting of his realized payo® is incentive compatible for agent 2, so that if he gets the item his report is
Hence, agent i's payo® from reporting q r ; c r when his type is q; c is u 1 (q; c; q r ; c r ; u r ) =
<
:
which is maximized at q r = q and c r = c. Telling the truth is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Two remarks are in order. First, in both examples telling the truth is not a dominant strategy equilibrium. If one player deviates from truthtelling, the other may also want to deviate. Telling the truth, however, is a best reply for agent i independently of his beliefs about the other players. That is, telling the truth is an expost equilibrium: it remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any prior distribution over types. Second, telling the truth is not the unique equilibrium of the mechanisms discussed in the examples and of the more general mechanisms we will construct in Section 4. These are features common to most papers in the literature. For example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) propose an auction procedure that is e±cient for single-dimensional types (and valuations satisfying a single crossing condition);
in their auction \truthful bidding" is an ex-post equilibrium (see also Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002)), but it is not a dominant strategy, and it is not necessarily the unique equilibrium. However, as they point out, it should be possible to use the literature on full Bayesian implementation surveyed by Palfrey (1992) to construct more complex mechanisms without the untruthful equilibria.
The crucial feature in the examples is that by observing his payo® an agent acquires new information. In particular, agent 2 learns one of the private signals of agent 1. It is not necessary for the payo® to perfectly reveal a signal of the other agent for e±ciency to be possible. To see this, suppose that in example 2 u 2 is a random variable that depends on the true value of q. In particular, assume that q is the expected value of u 2 if agent 2 gets the item. Given the assumption of risk neutrality of agent 2, it is clear that the transfers in (1) implement the e±cient decision in this case as well. As we shall see in Section 4, e±ciency can be achieved in the general case, and does not require that the private signal of any agent becomes known after the payo® realizations. Since valuations are interdependent, the decision payo® provides an agent with new information; extracting this information from all agents is su±cient for the designer to design transfers that implement the e±cient decision.
Let me now take up the issue of balancing the budget. In an auction setup one should require that for all possible type realizations the transfers to the agents add up to at most zero (so that the auctioneer doesn't need to transfer money to the agents). In a setup in which there is no auctioneer (e.g., a buyer-seller relationship), the appropriate (ex-post) budget balancing condition is that the transfers add up exactly to zero for all type realizations. This second condition is more stringent than the¯rst and amounts to
in the¯rst example and to
in the second example. By setting h 1 = ¡h 2 , one obtains that in equilibrium the budget is balanced for all possible realizations of µ 1 in the¯rst example and all realizations of q and c in the second example. (Note, however, that o® the equilibrium path the budget need not balance.)
Finally, by setting h 1 = 0 one can guarantee participation by all types of both agents (i.e., individual rationality). This suggests that interdependent valuations make it easier to achieve not only ex-post e±ciency, but also budget balancing and individual rationality (e.g., contrast these examples with the impossibility result in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
Example 3. Consider now the following special case of the auction model in Myerson (1981) . There is a single item for sale and two bidders (potential buyers).
Each bidder is privately informed about his own type µ i ; the other players regard µ i as a random variable with uniform distribution over the interval [0; 1]. Buyer i's valuation for the object is
where ® 2 (0; 1) is a known parameter. The seller valuation for the object is
Among standard revelation mechanisms, Myerson (1981) shows that the optimal auction is any common auction (e.g., a¯rst-price, a second-price (Vickrey), or an ascending auction) with a reserve price R 0 given by
Let µ (1) = maxfµ 1 ; µ 2 g and µ (2) = minfµ 1 ; µ 2 g. If the optimal auction is implemented either by a Vickrey or by an ascending auction with reserve price R 0 , then bidder i wins the object if µ i = µ
(1)¸R 0 , and pays a price p equal to
It is clear that by using this standard optimal auction the seller does not extract the full surplus. In particular, if µ (1) < R 0 , an event having probability (R 0 ) 2 , the object goes unsold and the seller obtains a lower payo® than either buyer's valuation for the object. 
where L > 2 is a constant. To see that the incentive compatibility constraints for the bidders are satis¯ed (i.e., that bidder i wants to report truthfully), note¯rst that p i does not depend on i's reported valuation u r i (of course, i only needs to report his valuation if he wins the object). Hence, truthful reporting of his realized payo® is optimal for the winning bidder in the second reporting stage. Suppose that bidder j truthfully reports his type in the¯rst reporting stage and if he wins he then truthfully reports his realized valuation in the second reporting stage. The expected payo® to player i from reporting µ r i 6 = µ i , while his type is µ i , then is
while i's expected payo® from truthfully reporting µ r i = µ i is zero. Clearly, for L > 2, U i is maximized by reporting truthfully in the¯rst stage, µ r i = µ i (telling the truth is a strict maximum). In this generalized revelation mechanism each bidder obtains a zero payo® and the seller extracts the full surplus.
The \shoot the liar" mechanism contains a discrete penalty jump for being discovered lying. One could also construct continuous penalties by setting the payments
2 ) to the seller as follows
where°> 0 is a constant. Suppose again that bidder j truthfully reports his type in the¯rst reporting stage and if he wins he then truthfully reports his valuation in the second reporting stage. The expected payo® to player i from reporting µ r i , while his type is µ i , then is
Again, U i is maximized by reporting truthfully in the¯rst stage, µ r i = µ i . In Section 5, I will provide a necessary and su±cient condition for the designer to be able to extract the full surplus from the agents in the general model. As we shall see, this condition requires, roughly speaking, that potentially pro¯table lies in thē rst reporting stage be detected with positive probability if agents truthfully report their payo®s in the second stage.
Before discussing e±ciency, full surplus extraction, and information acquisition, in the next section I will introduce a generalized version of the revelation principle that is appropriate for the case of interdependent valuations.
The Generalized Revelation Principle
A fundamental di®erence between interdependent valuations and the private values model is that with interdependent valuations the observation of the payo® from the decision conveys information to an agent. As we saw in examples 1-3, this information is potentially useful to the designer and a general model should allow him to use it. Thus, the designer should collect messages from the agents in two stages. In thē rst stage the messages collected should help determine the decision to be made. The second stage should take place after the agents have observed their payo®s from the decision; messages from both stages should be used to determine the monetary transfers to the agents. In most practical applications, the fact that monetary transfers should not be fully completed until after a decision has been made is not a limitation. equilibrium concepts for the games generated by this game form are perfect Bayesian equilibrium and its re¯nements. In this paper I will use perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In this section, I will assume that we can decompose the decision as follows: x = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ; y) where z i is only observed by player i and y is publicly observable; = ; for all i, then I say that the designer is using a standard revelation mechanism. In a standard revelation mechanism agents are not asked to report their payo®s from the decision. Under private values (i.e., if u i (x; µ) = u i (x; µ i ) for all i) there is no loss of generality in assuming that the designer only uses standard revelation schemes. More precisely, the standard revelation principle says that with private values any perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of any mechanism can be implemented as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome of a standard revelation mechanism in which reporting his true type is an equilibrium strategy for each player.
(Clearly, all Bayesian equilibria of a standard revelation mechanism are also perfect Bayesian equilibria.) Intuitively, in a set-up with private values, observing one's own payo® conveys no new information to an agent and thus the designer has no need to collect second-stage messages from the agents.
As I showed in the previous section, with interdependent valuations, restricting the designer to use standard revelation schemes is not without loss of generality. I now present the version of the revelation principle, that I call the generalized revelation principle, that is appropriate for a setting with interdependent valuations.
Proposition 1 (The Generalized Revelation Principle) Any perfect Bayesian equilib-rium outcome of any mechanism can be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of a generalized revelation mechanism in which reporting his true payo® in the second stage and reporting his true type in the¯rst stage is an equilibrium strategy for each player.
Proof. I will allow agents to use mixed strategies. Let ¢(S) be the set of probability distributions over the set S. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a given mechanism°= (M 1 ; M 2 ; e d; e t) consists of the following functions
¢ , and
where r i = (r 
It is important to observe that in a generalized revelation mechanism, at the beginning of the second reporting stage, each agent's expected transfer must be independent of his payo® message; if it were not, then the agent would not want to reveal his true payo® from the decision. The other agents' transfers, however, may vary with agent i's second-stage report. It is precisely this feature of the second reporting stage that allows the designer to collect new information at no cost, and to punish deviations from truthtelling in the¯rst stage that would not be punishable by using a standard revelation mechanism.
From now on, I will assume that types are drawn independently across agents; that is, the µ i 's are independent random variables. I will focus on the possibility of im- 
E±ciency
I will apply the generalized revelation principle and use generalized revelation mechanisms. Suppose that the goal of the designer is to choose an e±cient decision rule.
The
I will assume that (3) is always well de¯ned.
Let µ r i and u r i be the type and the payo® from the decision reported by agent i in the¯rst and second reporting stage respectively. Suppose the mechanism designer uses the decision rule ± ¤ , so that if µ r is the pro¯le of reported types, then the decision is x = ± ¤ (µ r ). To induce agents to report truthfully, the designer can use the following transfer function ¿ i :
The trick, analogous to the trick used in a standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, is to make every agent the \residual claimant" of the full surplus (I will worry later about balancing the budget). To see that this trick works, suppose that all agents except i truthfully report their types, µ r ¡i = µ ¡i , and their decision payo®s, while agent i of type µ i falsely reports his type to be µ 0 i (note that the report of his decision payo® does not a®ect agent i's total utility -because ¿ i does not depend on it -hence it is optimal for agent i to truthfully report his payo® in the second reporting stage). Under these hypotheses, it is
and agent i's total utility becomes
Hence, agent i will never pro¯t from falsely reporting µ 0 i ; truthful reporting is a best reply to the truthful reporting of all the other agents. The two remarks made in Section 2 are still valid here, and are worth recalling. First, telling the truth is an ex-post equilibrium; that is, it remains an equilibrium for all type distributions.
Second, modi¯cations of the mechanism following techniques from the full Bayesian implementation literature should allow the elimination of the untruthful equilibria.
Making all agents \residual claimants" could be very costly. However, it is always possible to make sure that the designer collects positive revenue, by selecting the following transfer functions:
With these transfers, the mechanism is similar to the so-called pivot scheme in the mechanism design literature with private values (a generalization of the Vickrey auction); the agent pays for the highest possible externality he causes to others (note that here the maximum is taken not only over the decision, as in the case of private values, but also over agent i's type).
Requiring that the budget balance (i.e., that the transfers add up to zero) is a more restrictive condition than requiring that the designer collects a non-negative revenue. This is the appropriate property to require of a mechanism in which the designer is a mediator -helping out the agents to coordinate -as opposed to the case when the designer is an agent himself (e.g., an auctioneer) trying to extract surplus from the other agents. I will now show that the designer can balance the budget.
Let E ¡i be the expectation operator over the random variable µ ¡i and E be the expectation over µ. The designer could subtract from the transfer ¿ i in equation (4) a charge h i , thus¯xing i's total transfer t i to be equal to ¿ i ¡ h i ; if the additional charge h i is designed so that its expected value is independent from the reports of agent i, then truthful reporting remains an equilibrium. Let
with E ¡(n+1) = E ¡1 . If all other agents report truthfully, then the expected value of the charge h i to a type µ i that reports µ r i is
where S is the ex-ante, expected (optimal) social surplus, a constant independent from µ i and µ r i . Hence truthful reporting remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium after the charges h i are subtracted from the ¿ i . Note, however, that it is not an ex-post equilibrium anymore. It is simple to check that on the equilibrium path (i.e., for µ i = µ r i ) the budget will be balanced (o® the equilibrium path the budget need not balance):
Since we already know that e±cient Bayesian mechanisms exist if valuations are independent (e.g., D'Aspremont and G ¶ erard-Varet (1979)), I have proved the following result.
Proposition 2 Whether or not valuations are interdependent, it is always possible
to construct an e±cient, budget balancing, perfect Bayesian mechanism.
While with private valuations it is possible to make truthful revelation (but not budget balancing) a dominant strategy for all agents, with interdependent valuation the dominant strategy property is lost. Another minor di®erence is that with private values it is possible to balance the budget for all possible reports, including non-truthful reports. On the other hand, with interdependent valuations the budget can only be balanced on the equilibrium path. This is because the transfers must depend on the reported decision payo®s, and not only on the reported types.
It is important to emphasize that Proposition 2 continues to hold even if payo®s are random functions of the agents' signals; the mechanism that I have described continues to guarantee e±ciency (recall the discussion of Example 2 in Section 2).
The close similarity of the constructions in this section to the standard VCG schemes under private values needs to be emphasized (e.g., see Green and La®ont (1977) , HolmstrÄ om (1979) and La®ont and Maskin (1979) ). In a standard VCG mechanism, the decision and the transfer functions only depend on the reported types.
Under private values, this is not a restriction and the e±cient decision rule can be implemented by giving each player a transfer that makes him a residual claimant.
With interdependent valuations, on the other hand, making each player a residual claimant requires that his transfer depends on the reported payo®s of the other players. Thus, we can think of the mechanism constructed in this section as a generalized VCG mechanism.
With private values, and for su±ciently rich domains (e.g., simply connected or convex set of valuations) VCG mechanisms are the only ones that allow the designer to implement the e±cient decision (e.g., see Green and La®ont (1977) , HolmstrÄ om (1979) and, more recently, Williams (1999)). Example 3 showed that with interdependent valuations there are other mechanisms, besides generalized VCG schemes, that implement the e±cient decision rule; the \shoot the liar" mechanism is not a VCG mechanism, yet it implements the e±cient outcome in that example.
I now turn to the issue of voluntary participation of the agents in the mechanism.
I will restrict attention to generalized VCG mechanisms (which, as I just argued, is a real restriction) and provide a su±cient condition for a mechanism to be individually rational; that is, to induce voluntary participation. If the designer were forced to use a generalized VCG mechanism, the condition I provide is necessary and su±cient for individual rationality.
Observe that incentive compatibility is not a®ected if a lump-sum transfers`i is added to the transfer of agent i, so that t i (¢) = ¿ i (¢) ¡ h i (¢) +`i. Obviously, if P n i=1`i = 0, then budget balancing is also guaranteed. Let U O i (µ i ) be type µ i of agent i's expected utility from not participating (his outside option utility). In most applied models the utility from not participating is taken to be type independent and is normalized to zero. However, allowing for the outside option utility of agent i to depend on his type is more general and entails little complication. Prior to the lump-sum transfer`i, type µ i of agent i's expected utility in the generalized VCG mechanism constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 is
where S i (µ i ) is the total interim expected surplus (or gains from trade) by type µ i .
Let µ ¤ i be the worst-o® type of player i
and let
be the expected loss of the worst type of agent i from participating in the generalized VCG mechanism, prior to the issuing of the lump-sum transfer`i. If P n i=1 L i · 0, then it is possible to add lump-sum transfers`i¸L i such that P n i=1`i = 0 and induce participation by all types of all agents. It is useful to look at this inequality in a slightly di®erent way. Let
Recall that S(n ¡ 1)=n is the expected value of the charge h i to agent i. On the other hand, C i is the expected gain above his outside utility that the worst type of agent i gets in the mechanism that makes him the \residual claimant" of the full surplus (i.e., the generalized VCG mechanism before the imposition of the charge h i ). Thus, starting from the \everybody is a residual claimant" mechanism, we can think of C i as the maximum expected charge that can be imposed on agent i. It is clear that the following inequalities are equivalent
and that if they are satis¯ed then participation by all agents can be achieved.
Proposition 3 If the inequalities in (8) hold, then it is always possible to construct
an e±cient, budget balancing, individually rational, perfect Bayesian mechanism.
Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) proved the counterpart of this proposition for the case of private valuations (in their case inequalities analogous to (8) are necessary and su±cient for individual rationality).
Full Surplus Extraction
Cr ¶ emer and McLean (1985, 1988 ) (see also McAfee and Reny (1992) 
and McLean and
Postlewaite (2001)) showed that full surplus extraction is generically possible when agents' types are correlated. In their model full surplus extraction occurs at the interim level. Each type of each agent participates in a lottery which leaves him with zero expected surplus. As a consequence, at the ex-ante stage (i.e., before knowing the agents' types) the auctioneer expects to extract the full surplus, while ex-post (i.e., when the agents' types are known) he sometimes extract more and sometimes less than the full surplus. This raises potential problems. First, the mechanism is not ex-post individually rational, and hence it may not work if agents have limited liability. Second, the mechanism may not work if agents are risk averse.
In this section I will show that with interdependent valuations it is often possible for the auctioneer to fully extract the surplus ex-post (i.e., for all type realizations) even if signals are statistically independent. I will assume that the functions u i (x; µ) are bounded.
Note that if all agents with the possible exception of agent i truthfully report their types and decision payo®s, then for all j 6 = i the reported decision payo® will be
where µ r i is the type reported by agent i and µ i is his true type. On the other hand, on the basis of the type reports, and on the assumption that all agents are being truthful, the designer would have predicted a reported decision payo® equal to 
I am now ready to introduce an identi¯ability condition which guarantees that the designer can extract all the surplus from the agents. 
I will now show that Assumption I is necessary and su±cient for full surplus extraction.
Proposition 4 Full surplus extraction is possible (with bounded penalties) if and only if Assumption I holds.
Proof. First I show that I is su±cient. Consider the following mechanism. The decision rule is the e±cient deterministic rule ± ¤ : £ ! X; the transfer functions are given by Suppose that all the other agents truthfully report their types and decision payo®s.
First note that agent i's total payo® does not depend on his reported decision payo®.
Furthermore, if agent i of type µ i truthfully reports his type, then he gets a zero total payo®. On the other hand, if he reports type µ r i 6 = µ i his expected total payo® is
which is non-positive for a su±ciently large, but bounded L, if Assumption I (or I 0 )
holds.
I now need to show that Assumption I is necessary for full surplus extraction.
Given any mechanism using the e±cient decision rule ± ¤ : £ ! X, we can write the transfer functions as follows 
Full surplus extraction requires that for all µ i it must be
Suppose that Assumption I is violated. Then there exist i, µ i , µ r i for which
and
Thus, for almost all µ ¡i we have°i
Hence, by (12) it must be
which, together with (13) , implies that the expression in (11) is positive and hence type µ i pro¯ts from reporting µ r i . As a result, full surplus extraction is not possible if Assumption I is violated.
In the following subsection I will apply this result to the linear model with a discrete choice set studied by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
A Linear Model with a Discrete Choice Set
Suppose that the decision set X contains a¯nite number of elements, X = fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g. 
In the second version of the model, the type set £ i of each player i is a compact subset of R NK : If µ i = (µ 
For simplicity, in both versions of the model I will assume that the distribution functions 
Proof. I only need to show that Assumption I holds. Suppose that there exists i, µ i and µ r i 6 = µ i for which
so that Assumption I requires that ¢ i (µ r i ; µ i ) > 0. (Otherwise Assumption I trivially holds, since it imposes no restrictions.) We have
where¸k equals the probability that µ ¡i is such that ± ¤ (µ ii is arbitrarily close to µ ii (so that x k remains the e±cient decision)
where¸h equals the probability that µ ¡i is such that ± ¤ (µ is pro¯table to player i. This is su±cient to make full surplus extraction impossible in this version of the model.
Information Acquisition
In a recent paper, Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) posed the following question:
Is it possible to construct mechanisms that (i) provide agents with the incentives to acquire the ex-ante e±cient level of information, and (ii) implement the ex-post e±cient decision rule? They showed that the answer is yes in the case of private values.
In the case of interdependent valuations (\common values" in their terminology), they restricted attention to standard revelation mechanisms and to the case in which types are single dimensional and a single-crossing, or sorting, condition is satis¯ed, so that standard revelation mechanisms that implement the ex-post e±cient decision rule exist. Nevertheless, they showed that no such mechanism provides agents with the incentives for e±cient ex-ante information acquisition. In their words, \ex-ante and ex-post e±ciency cannot be reconciled" (see also Maskin (1992) for a preliminary investigation of this issue).
In this section I will show that by allowing the designer to use generalized revelation mechanisms we can achieve both e±cient ex-post decisions and e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information.
The Model
To study information acquisition as in Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002), I need to modify the model as follows. There are still n agents and a set X of possible decisions.
However, there is now a set of possible states of the world, = £ n i=1 i , where i is a¯nite set for all i. The prior marginal distributions q i (! i ), ! i 2 , are common knowledge. The q i 's are independent, so that for all ! 2 the common prior is A posterior over the state of the world ! = (! 1 ; :::; ! n ) is given by µ(!) = Q n i=1 µ i (! i ). We can then write the expected payo® of agent i from decision x, conditional on the posterior µ, as
If u i only depends on µ i values are private, while if u i depends on the whole vector µ, then valuations are interdependent. The decision rule
As before, I will assume that ± ¤ (µ) is always well de¯ned.
An ex-ante e±cient allocation is a vector of statistical experiments
where
Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) showed that it is impossible to implement an ex-ante e±cient allocation with standard revelation mechanisms when valuations are interdependent. In other words, with interdependent valuations no standard revelation mechanism that implements the ex-post e±cient decision rule provides agents with the incentives for e±cient information acquisition. To see why, it is useful to look at a simple example. to a more precise signal, and hence to a probability measure with more mass around the endpoints 0 and 1. After observing a signal realization µ 1 , e±ciency requires that buyer 1 get the item if µ 1 > 1=(3 ¡°) and that buyer 2 get it if µ 1 < 1=(3 ¡°). Note that @u i =@µ 1 > 0 and @u i =@µ 1 > @u 2 =@µ 1 , so that, as shown by Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , an e±cient standard revelation mechanism exists. If the designer is constrained to use standard revelation mechanisms, then the e±cient decision rule can be implemented by the following transfer function
here h 1 is a constant. (I need not specify the transfer to agent 2, since it does not play a role in guaranteeing incentive compatibility. As in Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002), at least for the time being, I will not be concerned with the issue of balancing the budget.) To check that incentive compatibility is satis¯ed, note that if µ 1 > 1=(3 ¡°) then misreporting his \type" only a®ects agent 1's payo® if he reports µ r 1 < 1=(3 ¡°) and the item goes to buyer 2. However, such a misrepresentation decreases buyer 1's payo®, since h 1 + 3=(3 ¡°) < 3µ 1 + h 1 . Similarly, if µ 1 < 1=(3 ¡°) reporting a type µ r 1 > 1=(3 ¡°) decreases buyer 1's payo®, since in this case h 1 + 3=(3 ¡°) > 3µ 1 + h 1 .
Ex-ante e±cient information acquisition requires that the signal be chosen so as to solve the following maximization program max
or, equivalently, max
On the other hand, when choosing a signal, buyer 1 solves the following maxi-
Now let¯2 [0; 1] be a parameter, and consider the following program max
when¯= 0, the program above corresponds to (17) and when¯= 1, it corresponds to (18) . Note that, by the second order conditions of (17) and (18), we have
Note also that, for µ 1 < 1=(3 ¡°),
(1 +°µ 1 ) > 0 if and only if°> 0:
Since an increase in ® 1 puts more mass around 0 and 1 in the measure with distri- (17) and (18) 
hich is maximized at µ r 1 = µ 1 . Telling the truth is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, the private bene¯t, or payo®, of agent 1 is maxf3µ 1 + h 1 ; 1 +°µ 1 + h 1 g which is equal, up to the constant h 1 , to the social surplus. This implies that agent 1 has the correct incentive to acquire the ex-ante e±cient level of information. There is no con°ict between ex-post decision e±ciency and ex-ante e±cient information acquisition. Note that by setting h 1 = h 2 = 0, the mechanism designer can also balance the budget (as we shall see, this result does not generalize).
I am now ready to show that ex-post decision e±ciency and e±cient ex-ante information acquisition are compatible under very general conditions. Proposition 7 Whether or not valuations are interdependent, it is always possible to construct an ex-post e±cient perfect Bayesian mechanism which also provides agents with the incentives for the ex-ante e±cient acquisition of information.
Proof. Suppose the designer uses the (ex-post) e±cient decision rule ± ¤ (µ r ) 2 arg max x2X P n i=1 u i (x; µ r ) and the transfer functions:
where the charges h i are independent of µ r i . It is simple to check that truthtelling is a Bayesian equilibrium (the reasoning is similar to the one found in the proof of Proposition 2); hence, the speci¯ed generalized revelation mechanism implements the ex-post e±cient decision rule.
It remains to show that each agent has the incentive to acquire the ex-ante e±cient level of information. Given the speci¯ed mechanism and truthtelling in the ex-post stage, agent i solves the following ex-ante information acquisition problem
Given that F ® (µ) = F ® i (µ i )F ® ¡i (µ ¡i ), by independence in the signals, we have
a constant. Hence (19) is equivalent to
On the other hand, ex-ante e±cient information acquisition requires that the signals be chosen so as to solve the maximization program in (16) . The solutions to the maximization programs (16) and (20) coincide.
It is important to note that the proposition does not say anything about balancing the budget. (Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) do not address the issue of balancing the budget either.) It turns out that it is generally not possible to achieve ex-post decision e±ciency, e±cient ex-ante information acquisition and to balance the budget.
To see why this is so, suppose that the designer uses the generalized VCG mechanism described in the proof of Proposition 2, with the transfer functions
where the charges h i are de¯ned by equation (6) . Then, given truthtelling at the expost stage and equation (7), at the ex-ante information acquisition stage each agent i solves the following maximization problem max
which yields a solution with less information acquisition than the socially e±cient solution to the ex-ante information acquisition program in (16) .
While balancing the budget is not possible, as we saw in Section 4 it is always possible to run a surplus (e.g., in the case of an auction, to make sure that the auctioneer collects positive revenue), by selecting the transfer function de¯ned in (5).
With these transfers, the charges h i (µ 
Conclusions
The general lesson of this paper is that when there are informational externalities, the options of the designer are enhanced by exploiting the informational spillovers that are associated with a decision. A related point had been made by Hansen (1985) and Cr ¶ emer (1987) (see also Samuelson (1987) ). They showed that if the value of an asset (e.g., a target¯rm) to the winning bidder (e.g., the acquiring¯rm) becomes publicly known ex-post, then the seller can raise its revenue by using contingent payments as The generalized VCG mechanism introduced in this paper contains contingent payments, because the transfers to all bidders depend on the realized payo®s. This paper's setup is much more general, however, than the one in Hansen (1985) and Cr ¶ emer (1987). More importantly, I do not require that information becomes public, but I rely instead on the agents' reports of their own realized payo®s. Thus, the payments in the generalized VCG mechanism are contingent on the reported payo®s, not on publicly observable payo®s.
Some authors (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ) have claimed that the mechanism design methods I used in this paper are too informationally demanding, requiring the designer to have information about the signal spaces of the agents and the functional forms of the agents' payo®s. While I acknowledge that greater informational simplicity is valuable, I want to o®er two arguments in defense of my approach.
First, the full force of the mechanism design methods allows us to see how far we can go in implementing outcomes. Thus, I was able to reach conclusions that are in sharp contrast with the results one obtains with standard mechanisms (i.e., if contingent payments are not allowed). I have shown that e±cient decisions can always be achieved. I characterized the conditions under which one can have full surplus extraction. Finally, I have shown that the e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information can also always be obtained.
Second, the general lesson of the paper, that information that follows from an outcome should be exploited to achieve e±ciency, or surplus extraction, goes beyond the abstract mechanism design approach. For example, I conjecture that less informationally demanding game forms can be constructed in many situations that implement the e±cient outcomes, by using payments that depend on the reported payo®s of the agents. I have undertaken some preliminary research that supports this conjecture; I hope to report its development in a future paper.
